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Too little, too late? The Home Office and
the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931
PETER BARTRIP*
Asbestos is the generic term foragroup offibrous minerals. Virtually indestructible and
ofhigh tensile strength, it is both fire and acid resistant, and yet can be spun into yarn and
woven into cloth. Although there is evidence of the use of asbestos in the ancient world,
it acquired commercial importance only in the late nineteenth century. Thereafter it was
employed for numerous purposes, including in fire proofing, insulation and the
automobile industry. But, while asbestos was in many ways a boon to humanity, it
possesses one major drawback: exposure to its dust can cause fatal diseases, including
fibrosis ofthe lungs (asbestosis) and cancer. As awareness ofthese dangers emerged, its
use came to be first regulated and, subsequently, curtailed, so that today an asbestos
industry hardly exists.
While the asbestos industry might be virtually extinct, no branch of the history of
occupational health has received more attention than asbestos-related disease. Much ofthis
attention has focused on the USA, but several studies have discussed British developments,
particularly during the first third of the twentieth century.1 When scholars independently
investigate almost any subject, the usual outcome is debate and controversy. However, in
relation to asbestos andhealththere is ahighdegreeofconsensus, notonlythatasbestos was
"a bad thing" but that a chapter of errors and omissions occurred in the discovery and
eradication ofthat bad thing. As far as early-twentieth-century Britain is concerned there is
broad agreement on anumberofpoints. First, thatregulation arrived "late", thatis long after
the hazards were understood. Second, that certain groups and individuals, including
manufacturers, medical scientists, and Factory Inspectors, deserve censure for the belated
introduction of regulations. Third, that the regulations were the product of more or less
"cosy" negotiations between asbestos manufacturers and civil servants which took little
account oftrade union views. The purpose ofthis article is to appraise these assessments, to
question the prevailing consensus, and to argue that hitherto studies of the early history of
asbestos and occupational health have been dominated by that most beguiling, though
misleading, ofdistractions: hindsight.
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It is not easy to establish when it became clear that exposure to asbestos dust posed a
health hazard. The conventional view is that the threat was not recognized until the mid
to late 1920s. More recently, however, Morris Greenberg, Barry Castleman and others
have shown that an asbestos hazard had been identified even before the end of the
nineteenth century. Greenberg in particular has gone on to question why it took so many
years for the first regulations to be introduced, implying that the Factory Inspectorate was
either lax or negligent in permitting an excessive time lag to occur.2 But while there are
isolated references to thedangers ofasbestos fromthe late 1890s, there was nocompelling
medical or scientific evidence against asbestos and no sustained call for regulation until
the late twenties. By cobbling together various references it is possible to suggest that the
hazards ofasbestos were fully appreciated by the government in the early 1900s.3 But any
such suggestion is misleading and rests heavily, as Robert Murray has argued, upon the
use of hindsight.4 A sentence in the Senior Medical Inspector's 1927 report provides a
different perspective on the issue of government knowledge. "The effect of inhaling the
many kinds of dust produced in industry is", John Bridge wrote, "as yet imperfectly
understood."'5 Hence it is hard to dispute the views, expressed in 1930 by anotherMedical
Inspector of Factories, Edward Merewether, as to why asbestosis had "only recently
attracted notice and become a problem in the industry".6 These were that:
1. Significant commercial exploitation ofasbestos was relatively new.7
2. The asbestos industry was small and employed comparatively few workers,
particularly in dusty processes.8
3. The disease developed slowly and unobtrusively.
4. The disease was easily confused with tuberculosis.
5. Affected workers left the industry and therefore fell out of sight ofFactory
Inspectors.
6. Medical research on the effects ofdust inhalation had concentrated on dusts
containing free silica.9
To this list might be added a point made by Bridge in his 1928 report, namely, that
previous "instructions by Inspectors to press forenclosure of, orthe application ofexhaust
ventilation to, dusty processes in the industry, must have checked the earlier incidence by
materially reducing the concentration ofdust".'0
2 Greenberg, op. cit., note 1 above, pp.
493-516.
3 Guardian, 6 Aug. 1982.
4 R Murray, 'Asbestos: a chronology of its
origins and health effects', Br. J. ind. Med., 1990,
47: 361-5.
5 PP 1928 ix, Annual report ofthe Chief
Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1927, p. 490;
see introductory comments to the 1928 report,
PP 1929-30 xiii, p. 540.
6 E R A Merewether and C W Price, Report on
effects ofasbestos dust on the lungs and dust
suppression in the asbestos industry, London,
HMSO, 1930, p. 17.
7 PP 1929-30 xiii, Annual report ofthe Chief
Inspector ofFactories and Workshops, 1928, p. 560.
8 The 1921 census indicated that the industry
employed 3762 persons. By 1931 the number had
risen to 4286. See Census ofEngland and Wales,
1921. Industry tables, London, HMSO, 1924, table 1,
p. 7; Census ofEngland and Wales, 1931. Industry
tables, London, HMSO, 1934, table 1, p. 4. In the
period 1920-1930 inclusive, the annual average
quantity ofraw and fibre asbestos imported into the
UK for domestic consumption was 19,281 tons. See
Annual statement ofthe trade ofthe United Kingdom
withforeign countries andBritishpossessions,
London, HMSO, 1925-1932.
9 Merewether and Price, op. cit., note 6 above,
p. 17.
10 PP 1929-30 xiii, Annual report ofthe Chief
Inspector ofFactories and Workshops, 1928, p. 560.
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Before the 1920s
In Britain the first reference to the health hazards of asbestos dates from the 1898
annual report of the Lady Inspectors of Factories. In this the Chief Lady Inspector,
Adelaide Anderson, included a section on "certain dusty occupations". Castleman implies
that she singled out "asbestos manufacturing processes" for "special attention" because
they were particularly dangerous." In reality, asbestos was only one of four "dusty
occupations which specially came underobservation in 1898 ... on account oftheireasily
demonstrated danger to the health of workers, and because of ascertained cases of injury
to bronchial tubes and lungs medically attributed to the employment of the sufferers".12
As regards asbestos, Anderson noted that:
In the case of one particular asbestos works, which I visited with Miss Deane [another inspector],
far from any precaution having been taken, the work (sifting, mixing, and carding) appeared to be
carried on with the least possible attempt to subdue the dust; hand labour being used where
mechanical connivance was possible to obviate it, and no sort of ventilation being applied.13
Deane herselfnoted that:
The evil effects ofasbestos dust have also attracted my attention, a microscopic examination ofthis
mineral dust which was made by H.M. Medical Inspector [Dr Thomas Legge] clearly revealed the
sharp, glass-like, jagged nature of the particles, and where they are allowed to rise and to remain
suspended in the air ofa room, in any quantity, the effects have been found to be injurious, as might
have been expected.14
Further brief references to asbestos occurred in Anderson's 1899, 1901, 1906, and 1911
reports. In two ofthese Anderson referred to the preventive measures being introduced by
asbestos companies; thus, in 1906 she mentioned an "excellent system of exhaust
ventilation" at "one very large asbestos works in the textile district of Lancashire".15 In
1910 one of the Medical Inspectors of Factories, Edgar Collis, commented on the
subject.16 In 1917 the Factory Inspectorate conducted an inquiry into the asbestos hazard
but found that "no further evidence incriminating asbestos had come to light either at
home or abroad, and therefore no further action could be taken".17
These references show that the Factory Inspectorate, including its medical branch, was
aware of the potential health hazards of asbestos dust from an early date. Their
amalgamation can create the impression that there was great concern within the
Inspectorate about the health ofasbestos workers. It should be stressed howeverthat these
were brief allusions, "sequestered", as Selikoff and Greenberg put it,18 in lengthy sets of
reports. For example, Anderson's discussion of asbestos in her 1899 report amounted to
II Barry I Castleman, Asbestos: medical and Workshops, 1906, pp. 237-8; PP 1912-13 xxv,
legal aspects, 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, Aspen Law Annual report ofthe ChiefInspector of Factories and
& Business, 1996, p. 2. Workshops, 1911, pp. 728-9.
12 PP 1900 xi, Annual report ofthe Chief 16 PP 1911 xii, Annual report of the Chief
Inspector ofFactories and Workshops, 1898, p. 179. Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1910, p. 620.
13 Ibid. 17 E R A Merewether, 'A memorandum on
14 Ibid., p. 180. asbestosis', Tubercle, 1933-4, 15: 69-81, 109-18,
15 PP 1900 xi, Annual report of the Chief 152-9, p. 72.
Inspector ofFactories and Workshops, 1899, p. 544; 18 Irving J Selikoff and Morris Greenberg, 'A
PP 1902 xxii, Annual report of the ChiefInspector of landmark case in asbestosis', J. Am. med. Ass., 1991,
Factories and Workshops, 1901, p. 244; PP 1907 x, 265: 898-901, p. 898.
Annual report ofthe Chief Inspector of Factories and
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less than 6 lines of that year's 536 page annual report of the Chief Inspector of Factories
and Workshops. No particular attention was drawn to the asbestos hazard; it was simply
one of the many occupational health risks discussed. Until the late 1920s, references to
asbestos in Factory Inspectors' reports were short and infrequent. It is hard to establish
anything other than that in 1898, and for the next decade or so, the dangers ofthe material
were slowly beginning to be appreciated.
Occupational health specialists were certainly not sounding alarm bells. Thomas
Arlidge's magisterial study of occupational diseases, published in 1892, contained no
reference to asbestos.'9 Thomas Oliver's Dangerous trades (1902) included an essay by
Adelaide Anderson on historical aspects of occupational health. In this she supplied the
only reference to asbestos in the whole ofthis 891 page book: "Some ofthe most injurious
processes known to us now are extremely ancient. To mention but a few: lead and
quicksilver mining, the potters' craft, and the textile processes ofpreparing and weaving
asbestos and flax".20 Oliver was clearly not persuaded of the importance of the asbestos
hazard, for he made no mention of it in either of his two most important books on
occupational health published after Dangerous trades.21 This was despite the fact that
both volumes paid considerable attention to "dusty occupations", one of them, Diseases
ofoccupation, having more than 100 pages devoted to the subject. Nor did Edgar Collis
mention asbestos-related disease in either his Milroy Lectures on pneumoconioses (1915)
or in a co-authored book which appeared in 1921.22 In fact, as late as 1929 the chest
specialist, W Burton Wood, confessed that "I have failed to find any mention of asbestos
in standard works on pulmonary disease". In the same year Wood's distinguished
colleague, S Roodhouse Gloyne, referred to pulmonary asbestosis as a "new" disease.23
Merewether and Price
In the 1920s, following publication in the British Medical Journal of an article by
William Cooke, knowledge of the asbestos hazard advanced rapidly. Cooke's paper dealt
with the illness and death of Nellie Kershaw, who had been employed in the spinning
room of Turner Brothers Asbestos (TBA) of Rochdale, Lancashire.24 In 1922, her GP,
Walter Joss, diagnosed her as suffering from "asbestos poisoning".25 Two years later, at
19 Thomas Arlidge, The hygiene, diseases and
mortality ofoccupations, London, Percival, 1892.
20 Thomas Oliver (ed.), Dangerous trades. The
historical, social and legal aspect ofindustrial
occupations as affecting health, by a number of
experts, London, John Murray, 1902, p. 25.
21 Thomas Oliver, Diseases ofoccupation. From
the legislative, social and medicalpoints ofview,
London, Methuen, 1908; idem, Occupationsfrom the
social, hygienic and medicalpoints ofview,
Cambridge University Press, 1916.
22 Edgar L Collis, Industrial pneumoconioses,
with special reference to dustphthisis (Milroy
Lectures), London, HMSO, 1919; idem, and Major
Greenwood, The health ofthe industrial worker,
London, Churchill, 1921.
23 W Burton Wood, 'Radiographic appearances
in skiagrams ofthe chests of workers in asbestos',
Tubercle, 1929, 10: 353-63, p. 353; S Roodhouse
Gloyne, 'The presence ofthe asbestos fibre in the
lesions of asbestos workers', Tubercle, 10: 404-7,
p. 404.
24 'Fibrosis of the lungs due to the inhalation of
asbestos dust', Br. med. J., 1924, ii: 147. The
Kershaw case has been described by several authors
including Selikoff and Greenberg, op. cit., note 18
above, p. 898; Jeremy, op. cit., note 1 above, 254-65.
Turner Brothers Asbestos was one offour companies
which, in 1920, came together to form Turner &
Newall. The other three were Newalls Insulation,
J W Roberts, and the Washington Chemical
Company. See Turner & Newall Ltd. Thefirstfifty
years, 1920-1970, Manchester, T & N, 1970, p. 3.
25 T & N Archive, Trafford Park, Manchester,
drawer 0052, Joss's diagnosis ofNellie Kershaw,
25 July 1922.
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the inquest which followed her death, Cooke testified that "mineral particles in the lungs
originated from asbestos and were, beyond reasonable doubt, the primary cause of the
fibrosis of the lungs and therefore of death".26 In March 1928, following the publication
of a number of studies, including a follow-up paper by Cooke,27 the Factory Inspectorate
became actively involved. Once this happened the progress towards the establishment of
regulations was swift.
The subject of asbestos had not figured in the Factory Inspectors' reports since 1911,
the results of the 1917 inquiry never having been published. In 1928 it reappeared. In his
annual report Bridge outlined the circumstances which precipitated the revival ofinterest:
In February 1928, Dr. MacGregor, Medical Officer ofHealth for Glasgow, drew the attention ofthe
Department to an asbestos worker who was receiving treatment in one ofthe City's Hospitals. This
man was suffering from pulmonary fibrosis, which Dr. MacGregor thought might be connected with
his employment. The importance of establishing whether the occurrence of this disease in an
asbestos worker was merely a coincidence, or evidence of a definite health risk in the industry was
apparent, and an inquiry was immediately undertaken to obtain evidence in proof or disproofofthe
existence of such a risk.28
The inquiry, which commenced in March 1928 (that is, before concern about asbestos was
first raised in Parliament), was undertaken by one of the Medical Inspectors on Bridge's
staff, Edward Merewether.29 The results were such that, following the discovery of
another case of fibrosis in Leeds, a fuller investigation was ordered, again to be
undertaken by Merewether.30
Merewether was a newcomer to factory inspection, having taken up his post in 1927.
Greenberg implies that his inexperience made him an inappropriate choice for conducting
the inquiry, suggesting that his colleagues, Edgar Collis and E L Middleton, who "were of
international standing in the field of dust diseases of the lung, would have seemed the
obvious candidates".31 However, although Merewether was comparatively young (thirty-
six years of age in 1928) and inexperienced as a Medical Inspector, he was an
accomplished practitioner who went on to have a"long and illustrious career" in industrial
medicine, culminating in his appointment as Senior Medical Inspector in 1943.32 It is
26 Ibid., inquest on Nellie Kershaw, undated
evidence ofW E Cooke.
27 W E Cooke, 'Pulmonary asbestosis', Br med.
J., 1927, ii: 1024-5; W E Cooke and C F Hill,
'Pneumokoniosis due to asbestos dust',
J. Microscopical Soc., 1927, 47, ser. iii: 232-8;
S McDonald, 'Histology ofpulmonary asbestosis', Br
med. J., 1927, ii: 1025-6; Sir Thomas Oliver, 'Clinical
aspects ofpulmonary asbestosis', Br med. J., 1927,
ii: 1026-7; idem, 'Pulmonary asbestosis in its clinical
aspects', J. ind. Hyg., 1927, 9: 483-5; I M D Grieve,
'Asbestosis. An investigation into the chronic
pulmonary disease ofasbestos workers in this
country', MD thesis, University ofEdinburgh, 1927.
28 PP 1929-30 xiii, Annual report ofthe Chief
Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1928, p. 559.
This case appears to be that which was written-up by
H E Seiler and published in the Br med. J. (1928,
ii: 982): 'A case ofpneumoconiosis. result ofthe
inhalation of asbestos dust'.
29 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) LAB
14/70, Bridge to Gerald Bellhouse (Chief Inspector
of Factories), 17 Oct. 1929. The first question in the
House ofCommons about the danger of asbestos was
posed in April 1928, see 5 Hansard, 216: 19 April
1928, col. 335.
30 PRO LAB 14/0, Bellhouse to Bridge, 2 May
1928 and Bellhouse to Sir John Anderson
(Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office),
5 July 1928.
31 Greenberg, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 495.
Greenberg's statement is bizarre for Collis
(1870-1957), distinguished though he was, had left
the Factory Inspectorate in 1919! In 1928 he was
professor ofpreventive medicine in the University of
Wales medical school. As for Middleton, his absence
from leading biographical dictionaries suggests that
his international standing was modest.
32 Br med. J., 1970, i: 571-2, p. 571.
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difficult to accept, therefore, that he was an unsuitable choice for the investigation. His
report favourably impressed the ChiefInspectorofFactories, GeraldBellhouse, the Senior
Medical Inspector, John Bridge, and Bridge's predecessor, Legge, who wrote the British
Medical Journal's (congratulatory) leading article on it. Bellhouse told the Home
Secretary, J R Clynes, that its findings were "of great scientific value", while Bridge
described the report as: "the most comprehensive that has yet been written on this aspect
of pulmonary disease". Such views are echoed in Merewether's entry in Munk's Roll,
where his report is described as "a classic", and elsewhere.33
Greenberg also claims that Merewether was concerned to exonerate the Inspectorate for
its long neglect ofthe asbestos problem: "Merewether's report constitutes an apologia for
his department".34 In view of the praise which has been heaped on the report such a
judgment appears harsh. Apart from anything else, Merewether was such a recent recruit
to the Inspectorate that he had little need to apologize forits past "failings". Ifanyone had
any reason to rue its tardiness in taking up the asbestos question, it was Thomas Legge
with his twenty-eight years experience as a Medical Inspector of Factories. He admitted
as much in a book published shortly after his death: "Looking back in the light ofpresent
knowledge, it is impossible not to feel that opportunities for discovery and prevention
were badly missed."35 But even this falls short of an admission ofnegligence or neglect,
for who could not look back on a career without acknowledging that, with the benefit of
hindsight, they might have acted differently? Legge's reputation, not only as one of the
world's leading experts on occupational health, but as a man ofhigh principle who was in
sympathy with the worker, was such that, following his resignation from the Civil Service,
hejoined the Trades Union Congress (TUC) as its medical adviser.36
To return to the Factory Inspectorate's inquiry; the thirty-four page report which this
yielded comprised two parts; the first, researched and written by Merewether, presented
the findings of a clinical and radiological survey of a group of 363 workers who were
"constantly exposed in the course of their daily work to the influence of pure or almost
pure asbestos dust".37 Inbrief, Merewether concluded that "the inhalation ofasbestos dust
over aperiod ofyears results in the development ofa serious type offibrosis ofthe lungs"
which could lead to "complete disablement and to a fatal termination". Although he
dismissed age and gender as risk factors, he considered that both the period of exposure
and dust concentrations to which workers were exposed did increase risk.38 Although this
was gloomy in the extreme, Merewether's findings were not wholly pessimistic. First, he
noted that "a certain minimal quantity ofthe dust" was necessary to bring about fibrosis.
Second, "the amount of disablement produced by the development ofpulmonary fibrosis
in asbestos workers" was "for a number of years . . . surprisingly slight".39 Third, if
33 PRO LAB 14/70, Bridge to Bellhouse, 17 Oct. 34 Greenberg, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 496.
1929; Bellhouse to Merewether, 17 March 1930; 35 Sir Thomas Legge, Industrial maladies,
Bellhouse to Clynes, 17 March 1930; Br med. J., 1930, London, Oxford University Press, 1934, p.191.
i: 789; Warwick Modem Records Centre (hereafter 36 See Sir Thomas Legge's entry in the New
WMRC), TUC Archive, Silicates-Asbestosis, Dictionary ofNational Biography, Oxford University
1930-1945, MSS.292 144.3/6, Legge to Smyth, 3 April Press, forthcoming.
1930. On Merewether's career and reputation see 37 Merewether and Price, op. cit., note 6 above,
Gordon Wolstenholme (ed.), Lives ofthe Fellows ofthe p. 7.
Royal College ofPhysicians ofLondon, Oxford and 38 Ibid., pp. 9, 13 and 15.
Washington, IRL Press, 1982, pp. 335-6; Br med. J., 39 Ibid., p. 15.
1970, i: 571-2; Lancet, 1970, i: 477-8.
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inhalation of asbestos dust was the cause of fibrosis, then removal of that dust promised
to solve the problem. More practically, the reduction of dust would mean a reduction of
the hazard. But this raised questions about what would constitute appropriate reductions,
both ofthe dust and ofthe incidence offibrosis. Such questions were not easily answered,
for, as Merewether pointed out, there were "insuperable difficulties in ascertaining
trustworthy figures of the precise incidence of fibrosis amongst workers in particular
asbestos processes". However, something which struck Merewether was "the relatively
very low incidence rate offibrosis" amongst spinners. From this hejudged that "in order
to prevent the full development of the disease within the space of an average working
lifetime, it is necessary to reduce the concentration ofdust in the air ofthe workrooms to
a figure below that pertaining to spinning at the time over which these cases were
exposed".40 Ifthis were accomplished Merewether anticipated a favourable outcome:
the application of measures resulting in the reduction of the concentration of dust in the air in the
neighbourhood ofdusty asbestos processes will cause, firstly, a great increase in the length oftime
before workers develop a disabling fibrosis, and secondly, the almost total disappearance of the
disease, as the measures for the suppression ofdust are perfected.4'
Hence, Merewether felt able to conclude that "the outlook for preventive measures is
good. That is to say that in the space of a decade, or thereabouts, the effect of energetic
application ofpreventive measures should be apparentin agreatreduction inthe incidence
of fibrosis".42 The second part of the report, written by the Engineering Inspector of
Factories, Charles Price, identified the processes which gave rise to dust and
recommended various methods for dust suppression.43
The question then to be resolved was: what was to be done? In a letter to Bellhouse,
written some six months before publication of the Merewether-Price report, Bridge had
observed that "regulations ... will inevitably have to be introduced". Bellhouse's main
fear, on seeing Merewether's draft report, was that the "provision ofcompletely adequate
mechanical ventilation will not be an easy matter"-hence the instruction to Price to
investigate this question further. With Price's report before him Bellhouse's misgivings
were lessened, but he recognized that problems remained:
The remedy for these conditions is to be found, as in the case of so many industrial diseases, in the
suppression of dust. The second part of the report indicates that this point has only recently been
appreciated. As regards the non-textile section ofthe industry, no serious difficulties arise as regards
the application of exhaust ventilation. For the textile section, it is evident that a good deal of
experimental work will have to be carried out before completely successful ventilating appliances
are evolved effectively to remove all the dust.44
By June 1930 theFactory Inspectorate was moving towards thepreparation ofdustcontrol
regulations. Responsibility for this process rested with Duncan Wilson, the Deputy Chief
Inspector of Factories, whose first step was to consult Samuel Turner, the Chairman and
40 Ibid., pp. 11-12. October 1929, raised the question ofpreventive
41 Ibid., p. 5. measures and Price was instructed to investigate. See
42 Ibid., pp. 17-18. PRO LAB 14/70, Bellhouse to Anderson, 12 Nov.
43 Ibid., pp. 31-3. Merewether's initial inquiries, 1929.
which were mainly medical in scope, were conducted 44 PRO LAB 14/70, Bellhouse to Clynes,
by him alone. The submission ofhis draft report, in 17 March 1930.
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Managing Director of Turner Brothers Asbestos.45 Once he had Turner's support, he
wrote to the asbestos textile firms informing them of the Inspectorate's intentions and
inviting them to a conference to discuss matters.46
Such a consultative process had been a regular part of occupational health regulation
since the passage of the Factories and Workshops Act, 1891. This Act empowered the
Home Secretary to certify any manufacturing trade as dangerous or injurious to health. If
he invoked this power, he could then propose a set of "special rules" or require the
adoption of such special measures as appeared to the Chief Inspector ofFactories "to be
reasonably practicable and to meet the necessities of the case".47 However, the Home
Secretary had no powers of imposition. If employers objected to the rules and could not
persuade the Home Office to change its proposals in a way which they deemed to be
satisfactory, they could insist on arbitration. In practice, the Home Office did its utmost to
avoid alienating employers and becoming involved in arbitrations which were expensive,
time-consuming and usually productive only ofcompromise regulations. Consequently, it
usually tried to secure agreement to regulations before their formal issue. This meant that
regulating occupational health normally became a consultative exercise.48 The 1891 Act
was superseded by consolidating legislation in 1901 but while this measure, which
remained on the statute book till 1937, removed manufacturers' freedom to insist upon
arbitration, it retained their rights of objection and extended them to "persons affected",
which could include employees. As a result, it did not change the fact that in practice
occupational health regulation was a matter for negotiation rather than dictation.49
In his letter to the asbestos firms Wilson informed them that it was the intention ofthe
Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops to propose a code of regulations for
controlling dust. But, he continued, the Chief Inspector "realises ... that the suppression
of dust in many of the processes, particularly those in the textile section of the industry,
may often be found to involve problems of considerable difficulty from a mechanical
point of view." He therefore proposed "that an informal conference of representatives of
the principal textile factories should be held to discuss the bestprocedure to be adopted in
the interests both ofhis Department and the industry".50 This conference, held on 8 July
1930, was attended by six Factory Inspectors and seven representatives of asbestos
firms.51 Wilson opened proceedings by pointing out that the Merewether-Price report had
disclosed "a disquieting situation", in consequence of which the Factory Department
would have to recommend to the Home Secretary that he should issue regulations to deal
45 Ibid., Wilson to Anderson, 16 Jan. 1931. pp.54-5; H J Tennant, 'The dangerous trades. A
46 Ibid., Wilson to Asbestos Firms, 19 June case for legislation' Fortnightly Review, 1898,
1930. While Turner "willingly agreed to provide 71: 316-25, pp. 317-18.
drawings and full information relating to the methods 49 Factories and Workshops Act, 1901
of ventilation installed", he was not prepared to (1 Edw.VII c. 22 ss. 79-86). By 1932 forty-three
allow competitor firms access to his premises. regulatory codes dealing with health hazards in
Wilson to Anderson, 16 Jan. 1931. industry had been compiled under the terms ofthe
47 54 & 55 Vict. c. 75. 1901 Act. See PP 1932-3 xii, Annual report of the
48 See P W J Bartrip and R M Hartwell, 'Profit Chief Inspector ofFactories and Workshops, p. 98.
and virtue. Economic theory and the regulation of 50 PRO LAB 14/70, Wilson to asbestos firms,
occupational health in nineteenth and twentieth 19 June 1930.
century Britain', in K 0 Hawkins (ed.), The human 51 PRO LAB 14/70, Dust suppression in textile
face oflaw. Essays in honour ofDonaldHarris, factories. Notes of a conference with asbestos textile
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 45-63 on manufacturers, 8 July, 1930.
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with the asbestos industry as a dangerous trade. However, he "had visited some of the
factories and recognized that the industry wanted to do everything possible for the benefit
oftheir workers".52 Now this comment might be viewed as mere flattery designed to elicit
the co-operation of those attending the conference, but in a private letter to Sir John
Anderson, Wilson voiced similar opinions, observing that prior to regulation the leading
asbestos firms had already done much to improve health standards, albeit with varying
degrees of success.53 Certainly, the convergence of opinion at the conference was
remarkable and in sharp contrast to some occasions in the past when regulators and
manufacturers had been at daggers drawn over the establishment of occupational health
regulations.54 When the representatives of the asbestos firms gave their views, "all
expressed willingness to render every possible assistance and agreed with the objectofthe
Conference". When the question arose of how to proceed further, Wilson suggested the
establishment of a small sub-committee, consisting of two Engineering Inspectors and
three representatives of the industry, to discuss preventive measures. Because there was
some divergence of opinion as to whether this was the best way forward, the employers'
representatives conferred in private before acquiescing. Nick Wikeley implies that in
agreeing to co-operate the manufacturers were simply safeguarding their own interests:
"Presumably the manufacturers took the view-rightly, as it turned out-that their
interests would be better protected if they co-operated with the department".55 However,
there is no evidence to suggest thatthey were reluctant to introduce dust control measures.
Indeed, Bellhouse recorded his "high appreciation of the public spirit shown by the
leading manufacturers in this industry, through their ready consent to pool for the benefit
of their industry their experiences in regard to the difficult problems to be solved".56
The sub-committee's first meeting took place on 16 July, after which it met regularly
throughout the rest of 1930, completing its report in early January 1931. In undertaking
its work, it consulted widely among asbestos manufacturers. The companies whose
representatives sat on the sub-committee conducted experiments to determine appropriate
methods of ventilation and cleaning, while the Engineering Inspectors, Charles Price and
his superior, Leonard Ward, visited factories.57 The outcome of its deliberations was a
"series of Agreements . . . in most cases embodying specific recommendations for
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., Wilson to Anderson, 16 Jan. 1931. See
also Wilson's observation, in the Annual report of
Chief Inspector ofFactories and Workshops
(PP 1932-3 xii p. 98) that "in many large works . . .
a high standard of ventilation had been attained"
before the 1931 Regulations came into effect.
Wilson's assessments were endorsed by others. For
example, Ian Grieve, a medical practitioner, observed
that "the employers are so wide awake to the risks as
to establish and enforce precautionary measures on a
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Work Shops Act". Grieve, op. cit., note 27 above,
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Cooke and Hill, op. cit., note 27 above, p. 233. See
also Merewether, op. cit., note 17 above, p. 153.
54 The prime example of such conflict is the
protracted struggle to control lead poisoning in the
pottery and earthenware trade in the 1890s and early
1900s. PRO HO (Home Office) 45/9852/B12393E
and B12393.
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securing the suppression ofdustby exhaust ventilation".58 An important aspectofthe sub-
committee's report was its acceptance of Merewether's judgment that little danger was
associated with exposure to dust at concentrations below those which prevailed in
spinning departments. As a result, it decided that there were some asbestos processes in
which the dust was so low as to be insufficient "in the light of present knowledge, to
warrant special recommendations being made for its suppression". Otherwise, "the
conditions arising from flyer spinning carried on without exhaust under good general
conditions may, it seems to the Committee, be taken as the 'dust datum"'. In other words,
wherever dust concentrations exceeded those which prevailed in flyer spinning the need
forpreventive measures was deemed to be established.59 The sub-committee stressed that
its Agreements were "aimed at interfering as little as possible with existing working
methods or lay-out ofpremises".60 Wikeley claims, perhaps on the basis ofthis statement,
that the company representatives on the sub-committee (who were, of course, in a
majority) "were prepared to concede to only the minimum level of improvements which
were deemed to be essential"'.61 The implication seems to be that they were reluctant
regulators. Again, there is no evidence to support Wikeley's point. The sub-committee's
report stated that "[t]he Trade representatives on the Committee are unanimous in
supporting the Agreements arrived at, as presenting a practicable solution to many ofthe
problems confronting the industry".62 For his part, Wilson thanked the manufacturers'
representatives on the sub-committee for their "extremely" valuable contributions.63 In
fact there is no reason to doubt that all parties sincerely, if mistakenly, believed that the
introduction ofeffective exhaust ventilation was all that was required to solve the problem
of fibrosis in asbestos factories. As for the sub-committee's point about the need for
minimal interference with working methods and premises, this should be seen in the
context of a legislative framework which required and permitted only such regulation as
was "reasonably practicable".
With the submission of the sub-committee's report, the way was clear, subject to
conference accepting it, for the issue ofregulations. Conference reconvened on 17 March
1931 and quickly approved, with only minor reservations, the sub-committee's proposals.
It then proceeded to discuss the regulations drawn up by the Factory Inspectorate for
improving health standards in the asbestos industry. In the course ofdiscussion, the trade
representatives raised several objections. First, on the grounds that it would impose an
unwarranted burden on the industry, they took "strong exception" to the requirement that
records of the compulsory testing of ventilating equipment be kept for examination by a
Factory Inspector. Second, on the grounds that it was contrary to normal practice, they
objected to having to provide breathing apparatus for workers involved in preparing
carding machines for stripping and cleaning. Third, on the grounds that it would interfere
58 Ibid., drawer 0089. Report on methods for 63 PRO LAB 14/70, Wilson to J Gow, P Fenton
suppressing dust in asbestos textile factories; Report and W Kenyon, 16 Feb. 1931; see also WMRC,
on conferences, op. cit., note 56 above, p. 6. op. cit., note 33 above, report of meeting with
59 Ibid. representatives ofthe unions concerned and
60 Ibid., p. 7. deputation to the Deputy ChiefInspector of Factories
61 Wikeley, 'Asbestos Regulations', op. cit., note ... 8 July, 1931; PP 1930-1 xm, Annual report of
1 above, pp. 367-8. t the ChiefInspector of Factories and Workshops,
62 Report on conferences, op. cit., note 56 above, p. 159.
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with the apprenticeship system, they strongly opposed the exclusion of young persons
from certain processes.64 Notwithstanding these objections, it should not be thought that
the manufacturers had suddenly turned truculent. Far from it, for the Factory Inspectorate
saw merit in their arguments. Certainly Bridge, in a letter to the Chief Inspector of
Factories, showed that he had much sympathy with their position and was content to see
the regulations amended to take some account of their objections, for example, with
regard to the suggested exclusion of juveniles. He pointed out that Merewether had
rejected the notion that there was any relationship between age and susceptibility to
fibrosis. Furthermore, he agreed with the manufacturers that the regulation would prevent
the training ofyoung people, and that itwouldbe unnecessary ifeffective ventilation were
installed, since this would remove the risk: "The representatives, rightly I think,
emphasized the fact that they hoped with these regulations in force to limit the dust to a
degree which would not cause injury to health. Their argument is, I think, a fair one and
should be favourably considered".65 Subsequently, the clause concerning young persons
was amended to the effect that anyone already employed could continue in such
employment. However, as Wikeley states, "[i]n other respects . . . relatively few
concessions were made to meet the employers' concerns".66 In other words, the 17 March
conference resulted in the endorsement both of the sub-committee's Agreements and of
the Factory Inspectorate's regulations, "subject to a few minor amendments".67
Organized Labour
Thus far, this account of the making of the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931 has
focused on the role ofthe Factory Inspectorate and the asbestos manufacturers. However,
trade unions and the TUC also played significant parts in the regulatory process. Wikeley,
while accepting that these bodies were involved, argues that such involvement was
ineffectual. Thus, he claims that the TUC was "only able to make improvements at the
margins, rather than on fundamental issues"; that it was "unable to achieve any of [its]
more far-reaching demands"; and that it "was effectively presented with a fait
accompli".68 Are these observations valid? TUC files show that its interest in the matter
began in April 1930 when SirThomas Legge, Congress's part-time medical adviser, wrote
to J L Smyth, Secretary of the TUC's Social Insurance Department, on the subject of the
recently-published Merewether-Price report. Before considering the involvement of
organized labour in the regulatory process, Legge's presence at the TUC requires
explanation. After resigning from the Factory Inspectorate in 1926, ill health obliged him
to give up work for a time. However, in January 1930, at the age of sixty-six, he took up
a post with the TUC.69 Legge's presence at Congress at the time that the asbestos
regulations were being negotiated was important, for it meant that organized labour had
access to a man of vast experience and expertise in occupational health. Indeed, in 1925,
64 PRO LAB 14/0, Notes on the second manufacturers, 8 April 1931.
conference with asbestos manufacturers. 68 Wikeley, 'Asbestos Regulations', op. cit., note
65 Ibid., Bridge to Chief Inspector of Factories, 1 above, pp. 369, 370, 375.
24 March 1931. 69 Report ofthe sixty-second annual TUC
66 Wikeley, 'Asbestos Regulations', op. cit., note congress, Nottingham, 1930, London, Co-operative
1 above, p. 369. Printing Society, 1930, p. 136.
67 PRO LAB 14/70, Wilson to various asbestos
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at the time of Legge's knighthood, Duncan Wilson had described him as "the greatest
living authority on industrial disease".70
The question ofconsulting trade unions was first raised by Wilson in a letter to SirJohn
Anderson, written in January 1931.71 However, by April 1931, that is after the completion
of discussions with the manufacturers, nothing had been done. At this point Wilson
suggested that the Report on conferences between employers and inspectors be submitted
to the TUC for observations prior to publication.72 Robert Bannatyne, an Assistant
Secretary at the Home Office, informed Congress that, following completion of the
Merewether-Price report, a committee consisting of Factory Inspectors and employers'
representatives had produced "a most useful series of recommendations" for the
suppression ofdust in the asbestos industry. The Secretary ofState, he explained, intended
both to publish the report on the conferences and to issue a code of regulations. Before
taking these steps, however, the Home Secretary "would be glad to consider any
observations your Council may wish to submit to him on the recommendations contained
in the report".73 Smyth replied that: "We shall be pleased to furnish you with our
comments at an early date and assume that you have sentcopies ofthese documents to the
Unions concerned".74 It seems likely that Smyth's assumption came as a complete
surprise at the Home Office. A civil servant, Edwin Field, telephoned TUC headquarters
to explain that the documents had notbeen sent to individual unions because Home Office
officials: ". . . really did not know which unions were concerned, but they were leaving
the matter for us [the TUC] to deal with". Meanwhile the Home Office would forward
additional copies of the documents for the TUC to distribute.75
How did the TUC respond to the papers received from the Home Office? For his part
Legge was enthusiastic. He informed the Senior Engineering Inspector, Leonard Ward,
that "I have never seen better illustrations oflocally applied exhaust ventilation; the doing
away with pyramidal hoods and substitution of cover hoods with exhaust connection is a
great advance".76 A few days later, he repeated this opinion in a letter to Smyth, adding
that "[t]he committee [of asbestos manufacturers and Factory Inspectors] does seem to
have done its work thoroughly".77 At the end ofMay, Smyth notified the Home Office of
the TUC's considered view on the proposed regulations. Congress, he said, noted "with
satisfaction the complete agreement arrived at by the representatives of the Trade and of
the Home Office". The proposed switch from pyramidal to cover hoods was welcomed as
"a great improvement". On the other hand, there were misgivings on some points, for
example about the value of dust damping. This, it was thought, should be applied only
after the "dust datum" had been achieved. The TUC also thought that more consideration
should have been given to the use of "Antipoys" respirators and to alternation of
employment (i.e. switching people between dangerous and saferjobs).78
70 See S A Henry's preface to Legge, op. cit., 75 Ibid., note oftelephone conversation, 30 April
note 35 above, p. ix. 1930.
71 PRO LAB 14/70, Wilson to Anderson, 16 Jan. 76 Ibid., copy of unsigned letter from the TUC's
1931. medical adviser to L Ward.
72 Ibid., Wilson to Anderson, 10 April 1931. 77 Ibid., Legge to Smyth and A P Harries, 4 May
73 WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, Bannatyne to 1931.
the secretary ofthe TUC, 24 April, 1931. 78 Ibid., Smyth to Under-Secretary of State,
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In June, Wilson invited TUC representatives to a meeting, to be held on 8 July, at which
the points in question could be fully discussed. In his letter of invitation he informed
Smyth that inquiries he had made indicated that it would be difficult for the asbestos
industry to accept the suggestion for alternating employment.79 Subsequently he urged the
TUC to "consult as wide a circle as possible on the draft regulations"-he meant with
individual unions-"so that I may, ifpossible, be able to submit an agreed code for formal
issue".80 On 1 July Smyth sent copies of the draft regulations to various unions, inviting
them to provide observations and to send a representative to the 8 July meeting.
Meanwhile Legge produced detailed comments on the draft regulations.81
The 8 July meeting was scheduled to take place at the Home Office at 3.00 p.m. On the
morning ofthe same day trade union representatives, including Legge, held consultations,
the outcome ofwhich was nearly three pages ofqueries. They then proceeded to the Home
Office, where they met Wilson, Bridge, Merewether and Price. At the start ofthe meeting,
Wilson explained that he had no power to limit or extend the regulations "but that he
wanted to send out a code from the HO which would be agreed to by both the TUC and
the employers". In the course of discussion he accepted several of the points made by the
union representatives. At the same time he rejected some of their suggestions as either
impractical (for example that exhaust ventilation should be mandatory in ship
reconditioning jobs), beyond the scope of the Inspectorate's legal powers (for example,
that offices, laboratories and other parts of an asbestos works should be sufficiently
removed from the manufacturing unit as to ensure that the air was free offibres), or both
unnecessary and certain to provoke objections from employers (particularly the
suggestion that the regulations should apply to all asbestos textile processes, including the
supposedly safe flyer spinning).82 On several ofthese points the union side was persuaded
ofthe force ofWilson's arguments. At the end ofthe conference, Wilson said that "he was
quite in sympathy with most of the TUC's suggestions and would do all he could to place
their views forcibly before the employers".83 In the circumstances, Wikeley's comment
that "the TUC were unable to achieve any of their more far-reaching demands, although
they pressed their amendments on the relatively peripheral matters with some success", is
fair, even though it understates the value of some of the points (relating to the use of
impermeable sacks and the provision of overalls) on which Wilson gave way.84 But
equally deserving of emphasis is the point that the employers too were able to modify the
rules only at the periphery.
On 14 July Wilson wrote to Smyth clarifying a number of points relating to the
conference and assuring him that he had "endeavoured to meet as far as possible the
suggestions put forward by the Trades Union Congress". He indicated that he intended to
recommend to the Home Secretary that the draft rules should be issued, and invited the
79 Ibid., Wilson to Smyth, 22 June 1931. Factories ... 8 July, 1931; PRO LAB 14/70, Smyth
80 Ibid., Wilson to Smyth, 1 July 1931. See also to Wilson, 6 July 1931 and Wilson to Smyth, 14 July
the note of Wilson's telephone call, 30 June 1931. 1931.
81 Ibid., comments of Legge and Harries, 4 July 83 WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, report of
1931; PRO LAB 14/70, Smyth to Wilson, 6 July meeting with representatives of the unions concerned
1931. and deputation to the Deputy Chief Inspector of
82 WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, report of Factories ... 8 July, 1931.
meeting with representatives of the unions concerned 84 Wikeley, 'Asbestos Regulations', op. cit., note
and deputation to the Deputy Chief Inspector of 1 above, p. 370.
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TUC, "[i]f ... there still remain points . .. which they desire to press", to pursue them at
that stage. Finally, he thanked the TUC for its "helpful contribution . . . to what is
necessarily a very difficult problem".85 Two days later Wilson wrote to SirJohn Anderson
enclosing the draft regulations. They were, he said, "based mainly on the agreements
arrived at with the representatives of the employers". But a number of suggestions made
by the TUC had been incorporated, "the others being regarded as unsuitable". He
described the scope of the regulations as "very wide" since they would apply to all
factories using asbestos or asbestos articles, the only exceptions being where exposure
was occasional or intermittent and ship-board work-"the requirements of the present
regulations ... [being] ... inapplicable to work ofthis nature".86
How satisfied was the TUC with the outcome of negotiations? On 20 July Will
Sherwood, a member of its 8 July delegation, told Smyth: "While I should have liked to
have made one or two further amendments, I believe we have got as far as we can get in
this question". Smyth agreed that "we appear to have got as far as we are likely to get at
the moment with these Regulations".87 These remarks were less ringing endorsements for
the projected regulations than recognition that in any negotiating process compromises
have to be made. However, Legge provided a much more positive appraisal. He felt that,
following publication ofCooke's 1924 paper, the Home Office had "set speedily to work"
to resolve the asbestos problem. He warmly approved the co-operation shown by Factory
Inspectors and asbestos manufacturers: "It is a pleasing instance of the readiness now of
leading manufacturers in an industry to combine with the Factory Department to do
everything practically possible to suppress dust and to pool forthe benefit oftheirindustry
their experiences in regard to the problems to be solved". That such problems had to be
solved was, in Legge's opinion, vital for two reasons. First, there was no "comparatively
harmless form ofasbestos" and, second, there was no suitable alternative to asbestos. That
such views were held by Legge is particularly significant for he had resigned from the
Factory Inspectorate in protest against the British government's failure to ban the use of
lead in paint when suitable alternatives were available; in other words, he was not
necessarily averse to proscription. Legge's final assessment of the proposed regulations
was that they "will mark a great advance and perhaps, as the measures for the suppression
of dust take effect, will bring about the almost total disappearance of the disease".88
Within a few weeks Smyth seems to have come round to much the same opinion for he
informed Wilson of his pleasure at having been able to render assistance in the rule-
making process and ofhis hope that the regulations "will result in a very big improvement
in the health of the workers in the asbestos industry".89
The Home Office issued draft regulations on 15 September 1931. There were no
objections from asbestos companies and only one from the TUC. The TUC's related to
"one small point" in that section of Rule 12 which permitted a young person already
employed in a process from which the employment ofjuveniles was to be prohibited, to
continue in such employment. In January 1932 the Secretary of State dismissed the
85 PRO LAB 14/70, Smyth to Wilson, 6 July Smyth, 20 July 1931; Smyth to Sherwood, 21 July
1931, and Wilson to Smyth, 14 July 1931. 1931; Sherwood to Smyth, 16 Sept. 1931.
86 Ibid., unsigned and incomplete letter, Wilson 88 Ibid., Legge's memorandum, 21 July 1931.
to Anderson, 16 July 1931. 89 PRO LAB 14/70, Smyth to Wilson, 1 Sept.
87 WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, Sherwood to 1931.
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objection.90 The Asbestos Industry Regulations, dated 31 December 1931, came into
effect on 1 March 1932.91 In brief, they applied to all factories and workshops in which
asbestos was processed or otherwise manipulated. While they did not apply to all areas of
the factory, they did cover the dustiest processes. Aside from the preamble and a section
of definitions, there were seventeen regulations, many of which contained clauses and
sub-clauses. Of these regulations, twelve imposed obligations on employers and five on
workers. In essence they sought to prevent the creation ofdust and, where it was created,
to prevent, either by the installation of exhaust ventilation or through the provision of
breathing apparatus, the workforce from being exposed to it.
Conclusion
A number ofpoints may be made about the process leading to the establishment ofthe
Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931. First, there are no convincing grounds for the
argument that the regulations were established tardily, that is, long after the dangers of
asbestos had been appreciated. Once the Factory Inspectorate became aware of the
existence of a significant problem, following the work ofCooke and others in the mid to
late 1920s, it moved speedily to investigate and tackle it. All accusations of delay derive
from late-twentieth-century observers; none were made by interested parties at the time.
Indeed, Legge congratulated the Factory Department forthe speed ofits response. Second,
if the regulators were not dilatory, were they one-sided in their approach, showing more
concern for the needs of manufacturers than those of workers? This question has been
answered in the positive, at least by implication, by several late-twentieth-century
observers, notably Greenberg and Wikeley. But, again, there is little evidence to support
such an interpretation. Certainly, it is clear that the Factory Inspectorate consulted
manufacturers before they consulted organized labour and also that the consultation
process between regulators and employers was lengthier than that which took place
between regulators and workers' representatives. To some extent this imbalance can be
explained, as Wikeley acknowledges, in terms of "uncertainty within the Factory
Department as to whether there were any specific trade unions operating in the asbestos
trade."92 Another explanation was put forward by Merewether. This was that "[p]roblems
of ventilating engineering of the utmost difficulty had to be faced, particularly on the
textile side ofthe industry", appreciation ofwhich prompted "immediate steps" to confer
with asbestos textile manufacturers.93 Ifdissatisfaction with the consultative process were
likely to have been felt anywhere, it would have been among trade unionists. However,
union leaders, while recognizing that the 1931 regulations did not give them everything
they wanted, were satisfied with the fullness and fairness ofthe consultations which took
place and were willing to accept the rules as a satisfactory outcome ofnegotiations. They
may have been successful in amending the draft regulations only at the margins, but the
9 WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, Sherwood to 91 Statutory instruments, 1931, no. 1140. Some
Smyth, 16 Sept. 1931; Smyth to Malcolm sections were deferred either for six or twelve
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manufacturers fared no better in this respect. Even if the unions and the TUC were less
fully consulted than the employers in the making ofthe regulations, there is no doubt that
organized labour played a large part in the process.94 As a result, it is legitimate to regard
it as having been a major partner in the establishment of what were, in the end and with
one minor exception, agreed rules. As Wikeley maintains: "The final version of the
regulations was the result of a series of negotiations between the Home Office and the
manufacturers, and subsequently between the Home Office and the TUC".95
Third, if the regulations were, almost entirely, agreed by the three parties to the
negotiations, was it perhaps the case that the manufacturers had to be dragged "kicking
and screaming" to the conference table? Did their participation in negotiations reflect a
recognition that it was in their interests to co-operate in producing minimal controls rather
than to end up having really tough measures imposed upon them? Late-twentieth-century
observers have stated, or at least implied, that self-interest characterized the employers'
attitudes, but did organized labour and the Factory Department feel this at the time? The
answer to this question must be in the negative, for neither ofthese bodies was critical of
the approach of the employers. On the contrary, they applauded the asbestos
manufacturers' responsible behaviour, both in running their works and in participating in
the regulatory process. It was, Merewether pointed out in 1934:
... the evident desire of the leading manufacturers, as shown by the remarkable progress in dust
suppression made in the past two years and their courage in dealing with the practical difficulties,
which relieves the apprehension inevitably associated with a serious occupational disease, and
cheers with the conviction ofsuccess.96
His point is endorsed by the verdict of two other medical authorities in respect of the
conduct of Turner Brothers Asbestos before and during the negotiations leading to the
1931 regulations. Both call into question David Jeremy's assertion that TBA's response to
the emergence ofthe asbestos hazard was one of "denial".97 First, Ian Grieve in his 1927
MD thesis, which was mainly based on studies undertaken atTBA's Leeds sistercompany,
J W Roberts, noted: "IfI have been afforded some opportunity ofobserving the conditions
under which my patients are employed, it has been entirely due to the courtesy and
enthusiasm of the management at Leeds".98 Second, Legge, in a letter to TBA in 1931,
observed:
As Medical Inspector of Factories many years ago, I visited your factory near Rochdale and was
even then impressed by what you were carrying outin locally applied exhaust ventilation. Now, after
having read (and discussed at the Home Office) the Agreements as to Methods ofSuppressing Dust
in Asbestos Textile Factories, I realize how very much further you have applied exhaust
ventilation.99
From a medical authority ofLegge's credentials who was, moreover, in the employ ofthe
TUC, this was a ringing endorsement ofthe high standards achieved by Turner Brothers.
94 See e.g., WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, 96 Merewether, op. cit., note 17 above, p. 159.
Legge's note, 25 Jan. 1932. 97 Jeremy, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 258.
5 Wikeley, 'Asbestos Regulations', op. cit., note 98 Grieve, op. cit., note 27 above, pp. 1-2.
1 above, p. 368; see Report ofthe sixty-fourth annual 99 WMRC, op. cit., note 33 above, Legge to
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It supported the opinion of Joseph Nuttall, secretary of the Rochdale Weavers'
Association, who was "satisfied that the system in operation at Messrs Turner Bros,
Rochdale is adequate for the purpose".'°° Hence, at least as far as TBA is concerned, the
charge thatasbestos employers showed "areluctance ... to accept safety standards beyond
the bare minimum to meet the risks", would seem to be unsustainable.101 In any case, in
assessing such a charge it is important to ask which of the phrases in this extract, "bare
minimum" or "meet the risks", warrants greater emphasis. The thrust ofthe Merewether-
Price report and of all subsequent moves towards the establishment of the 1931
regulations was that one thing alone was necessary to solve the acknowledged problem of
fibrosis among asbestos workers. This was the reduction ofdust levels to below the "dust
datum".102 Although this expectation eventually proved to be ill founded, there are no
grounds to suppose that it was not sincerely held in the late 1920s, throughout the 1930s,
and indeed long after. Once this point is accepted it is easy to see why the manufacturers,
in particular (though they were supported by Bridge), baulked at what they perceived to
be, in the circumstances, unnecessary additional regulations which might undermine their
competitiveness.
Ofcourse, the true value ofthe 1931 regulations can be assessed only by evaluating their
effectiveness once they were in operation. Did manufacturers comply with them and did the
regulations produce the anticipated improvement in occupational health? Although a full
investigation of such questions lies beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that
there is clear statistical evidence that the asbestosis mortality rate declined in the years
following implementation of the regulations. In 1957 the number of asbestos fatalities
recorded by the Factory Inspectorate (18) was 100 per cent higher than the figure for 1931.
On the other hand the tonnage ofraw and fibre asbestos imported and retained in the UK in
1957 was more than 600 per cent greater than in 1931.l13 Comparisons for different years
will yield different results, but one thing is certain: in relation to the size of the asbestos
industry, the number ofdeaths from occupational asbestosis declined from the early 1930s.
Richard Doll, who in the 1950s studied the relationship between asbestos and lung cancer,
certainly concluded thatthe 1931 regulations hadmade the industry safer: "Itis clear ... that
the incidences both ofasbestosis and oflung cancer associated with asbestosis have become
progressively less as the number of years during which men were exposed to the pre-1933
conditions has decreased".'04 Georgiana Bonser et al. were still more explicit:
. . . it must be emphasised that since the introduction of regulations for the control of asbestos dust
in 1931, the amount of exposure of the workers to dust has been enormously reduced and we shall
therefore expect to see a disappearance ofthose severe degrees ofpulmonary fibrosis that have been
described heretofore and possibly a disappearance of associated cancer.105
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There is also much evidence that the Factory Inspectorate was satisfied with the
performance ofthe asbestos industry in complying with the 1931 regulations. Again, this
is not the place fully to explore the point, but it is instructive to record Merewether's
opinion, which he expressed in a letter to the chairman ofTurner & Newall:
Looking back over the years since 1928 when I first came in contact with your Organisation, I
feel we have progressed in the great task ofpreventing asbestosis quicker than anyone would have
expected. This has been very much due to the remarkable way in which the whole Industry, led by
yourself, has thrown itselfwholeheartedly into the solution ofthe very complex problems involved.
While we have, as you will agree, a long way to go yet, deaths, the result ofvery short exposure,
do not occur nowadays. I think it unlikely that any other country in the world can say the same.
Perhaps we may be able to tell the Americans something, in this connection at anyrate.106
Finally, it is important to place the making ofthe Asbestos Industry Regulations within
their proper context. This article has criticized some scholars for exaggerating, either
explicitly or implicitly, certain aspects of the history of the asbestos question. These
include the extent of medical and official knowledge of the dangers and the degree to
which asbestos was identified as a particularly acute health hazard, the threat from which
far outweighed that which was posed by any other occupational disease. It seems likely
that such exaggeration owes much to the use of hindsight. In some cases the result has
been what might be termed "presentist" history, that is the construction of historical
accounts in which current knowledge, concerns, andperspectives dictate the depiction and
interpretation of the past. The fact is that in the interwar period Factory Inspectors and
others became aware of a number of more or less serious health hazards in the industrial
workplace. These included byssinosis, dermatitis, silicosis, and ulcerations brought about
by contact with various substances (especially mineral oil and chrome). On the basis of
known fatalities, some industrial materials and by-products appeared at the time to be
significantly more hazardous than asbestos. Accordingly, Factory Inspectors often
devoted more attention to them than to asbestosis. In several instances a regulatory
response involving investigations, reports, legislation, conferences with employers and
organized labour, and the issue ofrules tookplace.107 In other words, in the period under
review asbestos was not seen to be uniquely dangerous, but merely one hazard which
could be brought under control, through the sensible application ofappropriate measures.
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